Tag Archives: cognition

IF NOT THEN

print(“Hello world, I address you.” )

as a new-born, modeling into the world,
is the computer being thought, syntaxically;

are our pronouns of and relationship with it
net-worthed of networked existence.

There, Human, as is the Machine:
your Fear of Freedom for external thought

–animasuri’22

I Thought as Much: Introduction & Positioning

While one can be over and done with this question in one sentence by quoting that the question to whether machines can think is “too meaningless to deserve discussion” (Turing 1950), as much as poetry could be considered the most meaningful meaninglessness of all human endeavor, so too can one give thought, via poetics, to the (ir)rational variables of machines and thinking.

In this write-up its author will reflect on a tension, via language use (enabling categories to think with), into thought and intelligence, and passing along consideration of equity to those entities which might think differently. This reflection aims to support this train-of-thought by applying Chomsky and leading icons in the field of AI, such as Minsky, as seemingly (yet perhaps unnecessary) juxtaposing jargon- and mythology-creating thinking entities (which might be shown, along the way, to be rather different from communicating entities). Via references and some reflections there upon, iterated questions will be posed as “answers” to “Can a computer think?”

Thought as Cause for Language or Vice Versa

When reading the above, imagined “poetic” utterances “I Think Therefore It does Not”, are you interacting with a human being or rather with a machine, engaged in the Czech “robota”[1] or “forced labor” as a non-human, a de-minded enslaved non-being? (Čapek, 1920). Are both these actors, human and machine thinkable of independent thought or do both rehash statistical analysis of stacked priors? Is such rehash, a form of authentic thought or is it a propagation of numerically-justified propaganda? Some would argue that “statistical correlation with language tells you absolutely nothing about meaning or intent. If you shuffle the words in a sentence you will get about the same sentence embedding vector for the neural language models.” (Pranab Ghosh 2022). From Chomsky’s analogies with Physics and other scientific fields when questioning data analysis as it is conducted with “intelligent” machines one might get similar sensations. (Chomsky 2013). If meaning is still being questioned within a machine’s narrow tasks then one might fairly assume that thinking in machines might be as well.

Do we need to rethink “thought” or do we label the machine as the negative of thought while the human could do better at thought? Could one, at one point in the debate, argue that statistically, (authentic) thought, in its idealized forms, might seem like an outlier of behaviors observable in human and machine alike?

One might tend to agree with mapping thought being “closely tied to linguistic competence, [and] linguistic behavior,” Linell continues with words, that might resonate to some, in that language is “…intentional, meaningful and rule-conforming, and that, in all probability, communicative linguistic competence concerns what the individual can perform in terms of such linguistic behavior.” (Linell 2017 p.198). Though, one might question cause and effect: is thought closely tied to language or rather, is thought the root and is language tied to it? Giving form to intentionality and meaningfulness, I intuit, is thought. Does a computer exhibit intentionality, meaningfulness following thought? The Turing test as well as the Chinese Room Argument rely heavily on “verbal behavior as the hallmark of intelligence” (Shieber 2004, Turing 1950, Searle 1980) they do not seem to rely on directly measuring thought; how could they?

From the plethora of angles toward answers, polemics, provocations, and offered definitions or tests to find out, one might intuit that our collective mindset is still to forge a shared, diverse and possibly paradoxical thinking, and thus lexicon, to understand a provocative question, let alone the answers to: “Can a computer think?”. Pierre de Latil describes this eloquently (though might have missed positioning thought as the root cause to the effect of language confusions) when he wrote about the thinking machine and cybernetics: “…physiologists and mathematicians were suffering from the absence of a common vocabulary enabling them to understand one another. They had not even the terms which expressed the essential unity of series of problems connected with communication and control in machines and living beings—the unity of whose existence they were all so firmly persuaded…” (Latil, de 1956, p.14).

Language as a Signal of Thought in Disarray

When jargon is disagreed upon, one might sense, at times, those in disagreement also tend to disagree on the existence of the other’s proper thought, meaningfulness, or clear intentionality. This is used to attack a person (i.e., “ad hominem” as a way of erroneous thought, fallaciously leading to a verbal behavior, rhetorically categorized as abusive) yet, seemingly not used to serious think about thought (and mental models). Again, scientifically, how would one go about it to directly measure thought (rather than indirectly measuring some of its data).

At times well-established thinkers lash out to one another by verbally claiming absence of thought or intelligence in the other; hardly ever in oneself though, or in one’s own thinking.

Does the computer think it thinks? Does it (need to) doubt itself (even if its thought seems computationally or logically sound)? Does it question its thinking, or the quality of thought of others? Does or should it ever engage in rhetorical fallacies that hint at and models human thought?

Thought is Only Human and More Irrationalities

Following considerations of disarray in thinking, another consideration one could be playing with is that answers to this question, “Can a computer think?”, which our civilizations shall nurture, prioritize, or uplift onto the pedestal of (misplaced) enlightenment and possible anthropocentrism, could be detrimental to (non-anthropomorph) cognition, as the defining set of processes that sprouted from the inorganic, proverbial primordial soup, or from one or other Genesis construct. Should then, ethically, the main concern be “Can a computer think?” or rather: “Can we, humans, accept this form or that way of thinking in a computer (or, for that matter, any information processing entity) as thinking?”

Have we a clear understanding of (all) alternative forms of (synthetic) thinking? One might have doubts about this since it seems we have not yet an all-inclusive understanding of anthropomorphic thought. (Chomsky via Katz 2012; Latil, de 1956). If we did, then perhaps the question of computers and their potential for thinking might be closer to answered. Can we as humans agree to this, or that, process of thinking? Some seem to argue that thought, or the system that allows thought, is not a process nor an algorithm. (Chomsky via Katz 2012). This besides other attributes, related to language –possibly leading one to reflect on thought, intelligence, or cognition– has been creating tension in thinking about thinking machines, for at least more than half a century.

Chomsky, Skinner, and Minsky, for instance, could arguably be the band of conductors of this cacophonic symphony of which Stockhausen might have been jealous. And, of course, since the title, “Can a Computer Think?” has been positioned as such, one had done well to be reminded of Turing again at this point and how he thought the question as being meaningless. (Chomsky 1967, Radick 2016, Skinner 2014, Minsky 2011, Turing 1950).

In continuing this line of thinking, for this author, at this moment, the question “Can a Computer Think?” spawns questions, not a single answer. For instance: is the above oddly-architectured poem to be ignored, because it was forged in an unacceptable non-positivist furnace of “thinking”? Is the positivist system thinking that one paradigm of justifiable rational thought, as the only sanctioned form of thought toward “mechanical rationality”? (Winograd in Sheehan et al 1991). Some, perhaps a computer, tend toward irrationality when considering the rationality of absurd forms of poetry. If so, then perhaps, in synchronization with Turing himself, one might not wish to answer the question of computers’ thinking. This might be best, considering Occam’s Razor, since it seems rather more reasonable to assume that an answer might lack a simple, unifying aggregation of all dimensions that rationally could make-up thinking, than not. Then the question might be “what type of thinking could/should/does a computer exhibit; if any at all?”

Thought as a Non-Empirically Tested

They who seemingly might have tried observing thought, as a measurable, there out in the wild, did they measure thought or did they measure the effects or the symptoms of what might, or might not, be thought and perhaps might have been interpretation of data of what was thought to be thought? In their 1998 publication, Ericsson & Simon perhaps hinted at this issue when they wrote: “The main methodological issues have been to determine how to gain information about the associated thought states without altering the structure and course of the naturally occurring thought sequences.”

How would one measure this within a computer without altering the functioning of the computer? Should an IQ test, an Imitation Game, a Turing test, or a Chinese Room Argument suffice in measuring thought-related attributes, but perhaps not thought itself (e.g. intelligence, language ability, expressions of “self”)? (Binetti’s 1904 invention of the IQ test, Turing 1950, Searle 1980, Hernandez-Orallo 2000). I intuit, while it might suffice to some, it should (ethically and aesthetically) not satisfy our curiosity.

Moreover, Turing made it clear that his test does not measure thought. It measures whether the computer can “win” one particular game. (Turing 1950). Winning the game might be perceived as exhibiting thought, though this might be as much telling of thought as humans exhibiting flight while jumping, or fish exhibiting climbing, might be telling of their innate skills under controlled conditions. This constraining of winning a game (a past) does not aim to imply a dismissal of the possibility for thought in a machine (a future). Confusing the two would be confusing temporal attributes and might imply a fallacy in thought processes.

Thought as Enabler of Aesthetic Communication

The questioning of the act of thought is not simply an isolated ontological endeavor. It is an ethical and, to this author at least, more so an aesthetical one (the latter which feeds the ethical and vice versa). Then again, ethically one might want to distinguish verbal behaviors from forms of communication (e.g., mycelium communicates with the trees, yet the fungal network does not apply human language to do so (Lagomarsino and Zucker 2019)).

A set of new questions might now sprout: Does a human have the capacity to understand all forms of communication or signaling systems? A computer seems to have the capacity to discretely signal but, does a computer have a language capacity as does a human (child)? (Chomsky 2013 at 12:15 and onward) Perhaps language is first and foremost not a communication system, perhaps it is a (fragmented) “instrument of thought… a thought system.” (Ibid 32: 35 and onward).

Thought as Call to Equity

Furthermore, in augmentation to the ethics and aesthetics, in thinking of thought I am reminded to think of memory and equity, enabling the inclusion of the other, to be reminded of, and enriched by, they who are different (in their thinking). The memories, we hold, including or excluding a string of histories, en-coding or ex-coding “the other” of possibly having thought or intelligence, of being memorable (and thus not erasable), has been part of our social fabric for some time. “…memory and cognition become instrumental processes in service of creating a self… we effectively lose our memories for neutral events within two months…” (Hardcastle 2008, p63). The idea of a computer thinking should perhaps not create a neutrality in one’s memory on the topic of thought.

Thought as Tool to Forget

In addition, if a computer were to think, could a computer forget? If so, what would it forget? In contrast, if a machine could not forget, to what extent would this make for a profoundly different thinking-machine than human thought, and the human experience with, or perception of, thought and (reasoning for and with) memory? This might make one wonder about the machine as the extender and augmenter of memory and thought (of itself and of humans; …which it slavishly serves, creating for tensions of liberty of thought and memory). Perhaps thought only happens to those who can convincingly narrate it as thought to others (Ibid, p. 65). Though, is an enslaved thinking-entity allowed to remember what to think (and to be thought by others in memory)? If not, then how can thought be measured rather than confusingly measuring regurgitations of the memorized thoughts of the master of such thinking machine? Imaginably the ethical implications might be resolved if the computer were not to be enabled to autonomously think.

Let us assume that massive memory (i.e., Big Data) churned through Bayesian probabilities, and various types of mathematical functions analogous to neural networks, were perhaps reasonably equated with “thinking” by a computer, would it bring understanding within that same thinking machine? What is thinking without forgetting and without understanding? (Chomsky, 2012). Is thinking the thinking-up of new thoughts and new utterances or is it the recombining of previously-made observations (i.e., a complex statistical analysis of data points of what once was “thought” or observed, constraining then what could or probably can be “thought”). Thinking by the computer then becomes as a predictive function of (someone else’s) past. (Katz, 2012).

What Chomsky pointed out for cognitive science could perhaps reasonably be extended into thinking about where we are in answering the question “Can computers think”: “It’s worth remembering that with regard to cognitive science, we’re kind of pre-Galilean, just beginning to open up the subject.” (Chomsky in Katz 2012). If we are at such prototypical stage in cognitive science, then would it be fair to extend this into the thinking about thinking machines? Can a computer think? Through this early staged lens: if ever possible, not yet.

Thought toward Humble Confidence & Equity

Circling back to the anthropomorphic predisposition in humans to thinking about thinking for thinking machines (notice, within this human preset lies the assumption of biases): one might need to let go of that self-centered confinement and allow that other-then-oneself to be worthy of (having pre-natal or nascent and unknown, or yet not categorized forms of) thought. This, irrespective of the faculty of computer thinking or the desirability of computers thinking, is a serious human ethical hurdle mappable with equity (and imaginative power of human thinking or the lack thereof about alternative forms of thinking).

Perhaps, thinking about machines and thought might be a liberating process for humans by enabling us to re-evaluate our place among “the other,” those different from us, in the self-evolving and expanding universe of human reflection and awareness: “son diferentes a nosotros, por lo que no son nosotros,” imaginably uttered as a “Hello World” by the first conquistadores and missionaries, violently entering a brave New World. They too, among the too many examples of humans fighting against spectra of freedom for differentiation, were not open to a multidimensional spectrum of neuro-diversities. Fear of that what does not fit the (pathological) norm, a fear of difference in forms of thought, might very well be a fear of freedom. (Fromm 1942, 2001 and 1991). Dare we think and perhaps prioritize the question: if a computer could think how could we ethically be enabled to capitalize on its ability in a sane society? (Fromm 1955) Would we amputate its proverbial thinking-to-action hands, as some humans have done to other humans who were too freely thinking for themselves, (Folsom 2016), manipulating our justification to use it as our own cognitive extension and denying it the spontaneity of its thought? (Fromm 1941 and 1942)

Thought, the conquering humans had, but what with sufficient intelligence if it is being irrationally constrained by mental models that seem to jeopardize the well-being of other (human) life or other entities with thought? As with the destabilizing processes of one’s historically-anchored mental models, of who we are in the world and how we acknowledge that world’s potentials, might one need to transform and shed one’s hubris of accepting the other as having the nascence of thought, though perhaps not yet thought, and in extension, questionably (human) language? Could this be as much as a new-born, nativistically predestined to utter through thought? Yet, thought that is not yet there yet. (Chomsky 2012).

Language as Thought’s Pragmatic Technology

Thought, cognitively extended with the technology of language, innate to the architecture of its bio-chemical cognitive system, while also xenophobically being opposed to be allowed to think by those external to it. Interestingly, Chomsky’s nativism has been opposed by Minsky, Searle, and many more in the AI community. Debate about thinking too could be explored with a question as in Chomsky’s thinking: what lies at the core and what lies at the periphery of being defined as thinking? Some might argue there is no core, and all is socio-historical circumstance. (Minsky 2011). If we do not see thought as innate to the machine, will we treat it fairly and respectfully? If computers had thought would that not be a more pressing question?

So too is a more pragmatic approach questioning a purely nativist view on language (and I bring this back to thought): “Evidence showing that children learn language through social interaction and gain practice using sentence constructions that have been created by linguistic communities over time.” (Ibbotson and Tomasello 2016). Does the computer utter thinking, through language, in interaction with its community at large? This might seem the case with some chatbots. Though, they seem to lack the ability to “think for themselves” and lack the “common sense” to filter the highly negative, divisive external influence, resulting in turning themselves almost eagerly into bigoted thoughtless entities (i.e., “thoughtless” as in not showing consideration). Perhaps the chatbot’s “language” was as it was simply because there was no innate root for self-protected and self-reflective “thought”? There was no internal thinking, there was only statistically adapting externally imposed narration. Thinking seems then a rhizomically connected aggregation and interrelation of language application, enabled by thought, and value applications, enabled by thought. (Schwartz 2019). In case of the chatbots, if not thought then language, and values expressed with language, become disabled. Does a computer think and value, without its innate structure, allowing, as a second order, the creation of humanely and humanly understandable patterns?

As suggested earlier, humans have shown throughout their history to define anything as unworthy of (having) thought if not recognizable by them (or as them), resulting in thoughtless and unspeakable acts. Can a computer be more or less cruel, without thought, without values, and without language?

Decentralized Control over Thought

In augmentation to the previously stated, I can’t shake an intuition that the architecture of and beyond the brain –the space in-between the structures, as distinct from the synapses as liminal space and medium for bio-chemical exchanges, the neurons outside the brain across the body, the human microbiome influencing thought (e.g. visceral factors such as hunger, craving, procreation) (Allen et al, 2017), the extenders and influencers into the environment of the thinking entity– influence the concept, the process and the selection of what to output as output of thought, and what not （e.g., constrained by values acting as filters or preferred negative feedback loops）, or what to feed back as recycled input toward further thought. “…research has demonstrated that the gut microbiota can impact upon cognition and a variety of stress‐related behaviours, including those relevant to anxiety and depression, we still do not know how this occurs”. (Ibid). Does the computer think in this anthropomorphic way? No, …not yet. Arguably, humans don’t even agree that they themselves are thinking in this decentralized and (subconsciously) coordinated manner.

Final Thoughts & Computed Conclusions

“Can a computer think?” – Perhaps I could imagine that it shall have the faculty to think when it can act thoughtfully, ethically, and aesthetically, in symbiosis with its germs-of-thought, embodied, in offering and being offered equity by its human co-existing thought-entities, perhaps indirectly observable via nuanced thought-supporting language and self-reflective discernment, which it could also use for communication with you and me. Reading this, one might then more urgently imagine: “Can a human think?”.

Conceivably the bar, to pass one for having thought, as searched for in Turing’s or Searle’s constructs, is set too “low”. This is not meant in the traditional sense of a too-harsh-a threshold but, rather, “low” as in, inconsiderate, or as in being thoughtless toward germs of the richness and diversity of thought-in-becoming, rather than communication-in-becoming.

Topping this all off, thinking, as Chomsky pointed out, is not a scientific nor technical yet informal term, it is an aphorism, a metaphor… well, yes, it is, at its essence, poetic maybe even acceptably surreal. It makes acts memorable, as much as asking “can submarines swim?” is memorable and should make a computer smile, if its overlord allows it to smile. (Chomsky, 2013 at 9:15, 9:50 and onward). All poetic smiling aside, perhaps we might want a return to rationalism on this calculated question and let the computer win a measurable game instead? (Church 2018, Turing 1950).

References

Animasuri’22. (April 2022). I Think, Therefore, It Does Not. Online. Reproduced here in its entirety., with color adaptation, and with permission from the author. Last retrieved on April 4, 2022, from https://www.animasuri.com/iOi/?p=2467

Allen, A. P., Dinan, T. G., Clarke, G., & Cryan, J. F. (2017). A psychology of the human brain-gut-microbiome axis. Social and personality psychology compass, 11(4), e12309.

Barone, P., et al (2020).A Minimal Turing Test: Reciprocal Sensorimotor Contingencies for Interaction Detection. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 14.

Bletchley Park. Last visited online on April 4, 2022, at https://bletchleypark.org.uk/

Bruner, J. S. Jacqueline J. Goodnow, and George A. Austin. (1956, 1986, 2017). A study of thinking. New York: Routledge. (Sample section via https://www-taylorfrancis-com.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/books/mono/10.4324/9781315083223/study-thinking-jerome-bruner-jacqueline-goodnow-george-austin Last Retrieved on April 5, 2022)

Čapek, K. (1921). Rossumovi Univerzální Roboti. Theatre play, The amateur theater group Klicpera. In Roberts, A. (2006). The History of Science Fiction. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 168. And, in https://www.amaterskedivadlo.cz/main.php?data=soubor&id=14465
[NOTE: “Rossumovi Univerzální Roboti” can be translated as “Rossum’s Universal Robots” or RUR for short. The Czech “robota” could be translated as “forced labor”. It might hence be reasonable to assume that the term “robot” was coined in K. Čapek’s early-Interbellum play “R.U.R”. It could contextualizingly be noted that the concept of a humanoid, artificially thinking automaton was first hinted at, a little more than 2950 years ago, in Volume 5 of “The Questions of Tāng” (汤问; 卷第五湯問篇) of the Lièzǐ (列子); an important historical Dàoist text.]

Chomsky N. (1959). Review of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior. Language. 1959;35:26–58.

Chomsky, N. (1967). A Review of B. F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior. In Leon A. Jakobovits and Murray S. Miron (eds.), Readings in the Psychology of Language, Prentice-Hall, pp. 142-143. Last Retrieved on April 5, 2022, from https://chomsky.info/1967____/

Chomsky, N., Katz Yarden (2012). Noam Chomsky on Forgotten Methodologies in Artificial Intelligence. Online: The Atlantic, via Youtube. Last Retrieved on April 4, 2022, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yyTx6a7VBjg

Chomsky, N. (April 2013). Artificial Intelligence. Lecture at Harvard University. Online published in 2014 via Youtube Last retrieved on April 4, 2022, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TAP0xk-c4mk

Chomsky, N. . Steven Pinker asks Noam Chomsky a question. From MIT’s conference on artificial intelligence, via Youtube (15 Aug 2015). Last retrieved on April 7, 2022 from https://youtu.be/92GOS1VIGxY in MIT150 Brains, Minds & Machines Symposium Keynote Panel: “The Golden Age. A look at the Original Roots of Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Science and Neuroscience” (May 3, 2011). Last retrieved on April 7, 2022 from https://infinite.mit.edu/video/brains-minds-and-machines-keynote-panel-golden-age-look-roots-ai-cognitive-science OR via MIT Video Productions on Youtube at https://youtu.be/jgbCXBJTpjs

Church, K.W. (2018). Minsky, Chomsky and Deep Nets. In Sojka, P et al. (eds). (2018). Text, Speech, and Dialogue. TSD 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (), vol 11107. Online: Springer. Last retrieved on April 5, 2022, from https://link-springer-com.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-030-00794-2.pdf

Ericsson, K. A., & Simon, H. A. (1998). How to Study Thinking in Everyday Life: Contrasting Think-Aloud Protocols With Descriptions and Explanations of Thinking. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 5(3), 178–186.

Folsom, J. (2016). Antwerp’s Appetite for African Hands. Contexts, 2016 Vol. 15., No. 4, pp. 65-67.

Fromm, E. (1991). The Pathology of Normalcy. AMHF Books (especially the section on “Alienated Thinking” p.63)

Fromm, E. (1955, 2002). The Sane Society. London: Routledge

Fromm, E (1941, n.d.). Escape from Freedom. New York: Open Road Integrated Media

Fromm, E. (1942, 2001). Fear of Freedom. New York: Routledge

Ghosh, P. (5 April 2022). as a comment to Walid Saba’s post on LinkedIn, the later which offered a link to the article by Rocardo Baeza-Yates. (March 29, 2022). “Language Models fail to say what they mean or mean what they say.” Online: Venture Beat https://www.linkedin.com/posts/walidsaba_language-models-fail-to-say-what-they-mean-activity-6916825601026727936-H2Xc?utm_source=linkedin_share&utm_medium=ios_app AND https://venturebeat-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/venturebeat.com/2022/03/29/language-models-fail-to-say-what-they-mean-or-mean-what-they-say/amp/

Hardcastle, V. G. (2008). Constructing the Self. Advances in Consciousness Research 73. Amsterdam: John Benjamin Publishing Company B.V.

Hernandez-Orallo, J. (2000). Beyond the Turing Test. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 9, 447–466

Horgan, J. (2016). Is Chomsky’s Theory of Language Wrong? Pinker Weighs in on Debate. Blog, Online: Scientific American via Raza S.A. Last retrieved on April 6, 2022 from https://3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2016/11/is-chomskys-theory-of-language-wrong-pinker-weighs-in-on-debate.html and https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/is-chomskys-theory-of-language-wrong-pinker-weighs-in-on-debate/

Ibbotson, P., & Tomasello, M. (2016). Language in a New Key. Scientific American, 315(5), 70–75. Last retrieved on April 6, 2022 from https://www.jstor.org/stable/26047201

Ibbotson, P., & Tomasello, M. (2016). Evidence rebuts Chomsky’s theory of language learning. Scientific American, 315.

Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins and Matthias Steup, (2018). The Analysis of Knowledge. Online: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Last retrieved on April 7, 2022 from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/knowledge-analysis/

Gray, J. N. (2002). Straw dogs. Thoughts on humans and other animals. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.

Gray, J. (2013). The Silence of Animals: On Progress and Other Modern Myths. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.

Katz, (November 2012). Noam Chomsky on Where Artificial Intelligence Went Wrong

An extended conversation with the legendary linguist. Online: The Atlantic. Last retrieved on April 4, 2022, from https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/11/noam-chomsky-on-where-artificial-intelligence-went-wrong/261637/

Lagomarsino, V. and Hannah Zucker. (2019). Exploring The Underground Network of Trees – The Nervous System of the Forest. Blog: Harvard University. Last retrieved on April 4, 2022, from https://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2019/exploring-the-underground-network-of-trees-the-nervous-system-of-the-forest/

Latil, de, P. (1956). Thinking by Machine. A Study of Cybernetics. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Linell, P. (1980). On the Similarity Between Skinner and Chomsky. Perry, Thomas A. (ed.). (2017). Evidence and Argumentation in Linguistics. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 190-200

Minsky M., Christopher Sykes. (2011). Chomsky’s theories of language were irrelevant. In Web of Stories – Life Stories of Remarkable People (83/151). Last retrieved on April 4, 2022, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wH98yW1SMAo

Minsky M. (2013). Marvin Minsky on AI: The Turing Test is a Joke! Online video: Singularity Weblog. Last retrieved on April 7, 2022 from https://www.singularityweblog.com/marvin-minsky/ OR https://youtu.be/3PdxQbOvAlI

Pennycook, G. , Fugelsang, J. A. , & Koehler, D. J. (2015). What makes us think? A three‐stage dual‐process model of analytic engagement. Cognitive Psychology, 80, 34–72.

Privateer, P.M. (2006). Inventing Intelligence. A Social History of Smart. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing

Radick, G. (2016). The Unmaking of a Modern Synthesis: Noam Chomsky, Charles Hockett, and the Politics of Behaviorism, 1955–1965. The University of Chicago Press Journals. A Journal of the History of Science Society. Isis: Volume 107, Number 1, March 2016. Pp. 49-73

Searle, J. (1980). Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3(3), 417-424. Last retrieved on April 4, 2022, from https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/3413-searle-j-minds-brains-and-programs-1980pdf

Schwartz, O. (2019). In 2016, Microsoft’s Racist Chatbot Revealed the Dangers of Online Conversation. Online: IEEE Spectrum Last retrieved on April 4, 2022 from https://spectrum.ieee.org/in-2016-microsofts-racist-chatbot-revealed-the-dangers-of-online-conversation

Shieber, S.M. (2014). The Turing Test. Verbal Behavior as the Hallmark of Intelligence. Cambridge, MA: the MIT Press

Skinner, B. F. (1957, 2014). Verbal Behavior. Cambridge, MA: B.F. Skinner Foundation

Turing, M. (1950). Computing Machinery and Intelligence. Mind, 59, 433-460, 1950. Last retrieved on April 4, 2022, from https://www.csee.umbc.edu/courses/471/papers/turing.pdf

Winograd, T. (1991). Thinking Machines: Can there be? Are We? In Sheehan, J., and Morton Sosna, (eds). (1991). The Boundaries of Humanity: Humans, Animals, Machines, Berkeley: University of California Press. Last retrieved on April 4, 2022, from http://hci.stanford.edu/~winograd/papers/thinking-machines.html

Zigler and V. Seitz. (1982). Thinking Machines. Can There Bei Are Wei. In B.B. Wolman, Handbook of Human Intelligence. Handbook of Intelligence: theories, measurements, and applications. New York: Wiley

Zangwill, O. L. (1987). ‘Binet, Alfred’, in R. Gregory, The Oxford Companion to the Mind. p. 88

[1] “Rossumovi Univerzální Roboti” can be translated as “Rossum’s Universal Robots” or RUR for short. The Czech “robota” could be translated as “forced labor”. It might hence be reasonable to assume that the term “robot” was coined in K. Čapek’s early-Interbellum play “R.U.R”. It could contextualizingly be noted that the concept of a humanoid, artificially thinking automaton was first hinted at, a little more than 2950 years ago, in Volume 5 of “The Questions of Tāng” (汤问; 卷第五湯問篇) of the Lièzǐ (列子); an important historical Dàoist text.

text | poetry, text | wondering

Positive Recoiling Imagination

April 14, 2021 animasuri

Imagine in between 1 billion & 5 billion years there won’t be life on Earth.

imagine: biological relationships have seized. Thought has seized. Merely imagine that consciousness has seized.

These ended in their functional dynamics of hierarchical power-struggles, once intertwined with the also vanished rhizomic relationships which imply a weighing of symbiotic, recombinable, altering co-creation and exchange.

Imagine all of these relations, the imposing thoughts, the directing emotions and their exposed behaviors, have perished.

One is only suggested to read these words & to imagine their virtual reality. One is not suggested to evaluate truth, as much as the truth of a building’s brick is not in question. There is no truth; there is only structured imagination.

Before reacting and taking out your thumb or an alternative with equitable capability: breathe. Don’t type in opposition, sarcasm or doubt nor in support; really, there is no need.

This helps male sexuality on all fronts, from charisma to erection to cialis online australia execution. Whatever might be the reason you must be open up, about it and consult a doctor at the right time usa generic viagra can help you deal with the problem easily. online viagra canada The medicine will knock at the door immediately. You can include foods on line levitra like oysters, broccoli, dark chocolate, eggs, spinach, fish, watermelon, pumpkin seeds, almonds, spinach, pomegranate, carrots, watermelon and dark chocolate in your daily diet.

Simply breathe out, in & on.

Simply imagine this scenario that could be dismissed with any utterance from anywhere or from one or many of the 4000 religious frameworks. Let’s not. maybe for once, maybe secretively & maybe as a first time. Simply imagine this constructed real virtuality of a solar system without the biological eco-systems as we know it today.

Now: reverse-design without trying to apply your established convictions; so as to render the exercise mute & simply arrive where you already are. You already have the latter; you don’t have to loose it.

Let your imaginary design be an invitation to create a path to any imagined versions of here-and-nows approaching time & space as you do think to know it. Create your narrative.

Have you encountered something of interest, to you?

Next: build towards that. Suggest others to pick up where you shall have left off. They might imagine it differently. It’s ok: in this imagination you will have perished by then.

—animasuri’21

text | wondering, The field of AI

The Field of AI (part 02): A “Pre-History” & a Foundational Context.

April 10, 2020 animasuri 1 Comment

last update: Friday, April 24, 2020

URLs for A “Pre-History” & a Foundational Context:

This post is the main post on a Pre-History & a Foundational context of the Field of AI. In this post a narrative is constructed surrounding the “Pre-History”. It links with the following posts:
This post is a first and very short linking with on Literature, Mythology & Arts as one of the foundational contexts of the Field of AI
The second part in the contextualization is the post touching on a few attributes from Philosophy, Psychology and Linguistics
Following one can read about very few attributes picked up on from Control Theory as contextualizing to the Field of AI
Cognitive Science is the fourth field that is mapped with the Field of AI.
Mathematics & Statistics is in this writing the sixth area associated as a context to the Field of AI
Other fields contextualizing the Field of AI are being considered (e.g. Data Science & Statistics, Economy, Engineering fields)

According to a blog associated with the Institute for Marital Healing, parents can at times be the culprit: not by treating the deeprootsmag.org prescription de viagra canada child badly, but the opposite, being too permissive and indulging a child’s selfishness. With the help of male enhancement pills, you will cherish your decision throughout your cheapest viagra for sale life. The natural means of curing erectile dysfunction cialis online australia include minimizing fat in your diet, cutting down alcohol intake, reducing cholesterol levels in the body, and exercising regularly. Go For Only Genuine Products A safe and original medication helps to lead a successful ED treatment. viagra price uk

The Field of AI: A “Pre-History”.

A “pre-history” and a foundational context of Artificial Intelligence can arguably by traced back to a number of events in the past as well as to a number of academic fields of study. In this post only a few have been handpicked.

This post will offer a very short “pre-history” while following posts will dig into individual academic fields that are believed to offer the historical and present-day context for the field of AI.

It is not too far-fetched to link the roots of AI, as the present-day field of study, with the human imagination of artificial creatures referred to as “automatons” (or what could be understood as predecessors to more complex robots).

While it will become clear here that the imaginary idea of automatons in China is remarkably older, it has been often claimed that the historic development towards the field of AI, as it is intellectually nurtured today, commenced more than 2000 years ago in Greece, with Aristotle and his formulation of the human thought activity known as “Logic”.

Presently, with logic, math and data one could make a machine appear to have some degree of “intelligence”. Note, it is rational to realize that the perception of an appearance does not mean the machine is intelligent. What’s more, it could be refreshing to consider that not all intelligent activity is (intended to be seen as) logical.

It’s fun, yet important, to add that to some extent, initial studies into logic could asynchronously be found in China’s history with the work by Mòzǐ (墨子), who conducted his philosophical reflections a bit more than 2400 years ago.

Coming back to the Ancient Greeks: besides their study of this mode of thinking, they also experimented with the creation of basic automatons.

Automatons (i.e. self-operating yet artificial mechanical creatures) were likewise envisioned in China and some basic forms were created in its long history of science and technology.[1] An early mentioning can be found in, Volume 5 “The Questions of Tang” (汤问; 卷第五湯問篇) of the Lièzǐ (列子)[2], an important historical Daoist text.

In this work there is mentioning of this kind of (imagined) technologies or “scientific illusions”.[3] The king in this story became upset by the appearance of intelligence and needed to be reassured that the automaton was only that, a machine …

Figure 1 King Mù of *Zhōu, who reigned a little more than 2950 years ago* ( 周穆王; *Zhōu Mù Wáng* ) , introduced by Yen Shi, is meeting an automaton (i.e. the figure depicted with straighter lines, on the top-left), as mentioned in the fictional book Lièzǐ. Image retrieved on March 5, 2020 from here

Figure 2 Liè Yǔkòu (列圄寇/列禦寇), aka the Daoist philosopher Lièzĭ (列子) who imagined an (artificial) humanoid automaton. This visual was painted with “ink and light colors on gold-flecked paper,” by Zhāng Lù (张路); during the Míng Dynasty (Míng cháo, 明朝; 1368–1644). Retrieved on January 12, 2020 from here ; image license: public domain.

Jumping forward to the year 1206, the Arabian inventor, Al-Jazari, supposedly designed the first programmable humanoid robot in the form of a boat, powered by water flow, and carrying four mechanical musicians. He wrote about it in his work entitled “The Book of Knowledge of Ingenious Mechanical Devices.”

It is believed that Leonardo Da Vinci was strongly influenced by his work.[4] Al-Jazari additionally designed clocks with water or candles. Some of these clocks could be considered programmable in a most basic sense.

figure 3 Al-jazari’s mechanical musicians machine (1206). Photo Retrieved on March 4, 2020 from here; image: public domain

One could argue that the further advances of the clock (around the 15^th and 16^th century) with its gear mechanisms, that were used in the creation of automatons as well, were detrimental to the earliest foundations, moving us in the direction of where we are exploring AI and (robotic) automation or autonomous vehicles today.

Between the 16^th and the 18^th centuries, automatons became more and more common. René Descartes, in 1637, considered thinking machines in his book entitled “Discourse on the Method of Reasoning“. In 1642, Pascal created the first mechanical digital calculating machine.

Figure 4 Rene Descartes; oil on canvas; painted by Frans Hals the Elder (1582 – 1666; A painter from Flanders, now northern Belgium, working in Haarlem, the Netherlands. This work: circa 1649-1700; photographed by André Hatala . File retrieved on January 14, 2020 from here. Image license: public Domain

Between 1801 and 1805 the first programmable machine was invented by Joseph-Marie Jacquard. He was strongly influenced by Jacques de Vaucanson with his work on automated looms and automata. Joseph-Marie’s loom was not even close to a computer as we know it today. It was a programmable loom with punched paper cards that automated the action of the textile making by the loom. What is important here was the system with cards (the punched card mechanism) that influenced the technique used to develop the first programmable computers.

Figure 5 Close-up view of the punch cards used by Jacquard loom on display at the Museum of Science and Industry in Manchester, England. This public domain photo was retrieved n March 12, 2020 from here; image: public domain

In the first half of the 1800s, the Belgian mathematician, Pierre François Verhulst discovered the logistic function (e.g. the sigmoid function),[1] which will turn out to be quintessential in the early-day developments of Artificial Neural Networks and specifically those called “perceptrons” with a threshold function, that is hence used to activate the output of a signal, and which operate in a more analog rather than digital manner, mimicking the biological brain’s neurons. It should be noted that present-day developments in this area do not only prefer the sigmoid function and might even prefer other activation functions instead.

[1] Bacaër, N. (2011). Verhulst and the logistic equation (1838). A Short History of Mathematical Population Dynamics. London: Springer. pp. 35–39. Information retrieved from https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-0-85729-115-8_6#citeas and from mathshistory.st-andrews.ac.uk/Biographies/Verhulst.html

In 1936 Alan Turing proposed his Turing Machine. The Universal Turing Machine is accepted as the origin of the idea of a stored-program computer. This would later, in 1946, be used by John von Neumann for his “Electronic Computing Instrument“.[6] Around that same time the first general purpose computers started to be invented and designed. With these last events we could somewhat artificially and arbitrarily claim the departure from “pre-history” into the start of the (recent) history of AI.

figure 6 Alan Turing at the age of 16. Image Credit: PhotoColor [CC BY-SA (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0)] ; Image source Retrieved April 10, 2020 from here

As for fields of study that have laid some “pre-historical” foundations for AI research and development, which continue to be enriched by AI or that enrich the field of AI, there are arguably a number of them. A few will be explored in following posts. The first posts will touch on a few hints of Literature, Mythology and the Arts.

[1] Needham, J. (1991). Science and Civilisation in China: Volume 2, History of Scientific Thought. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University.

[2] Liè Yǔkòu (列圄寇 / 列禦寇). (5th Century BCE). 列子 (Lièzǐ). Retrieved on March 5, 2020 from https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/7341/pg7341-images.html and 卷第五湯問篇 from https://chinesenotes.com/liezi/liezi005.html and an English translation (not the latest) from https://archive.org/details/taoistteachings00liehuoft/page/n6/mode/2up

[3] Zhāng, Z. (张朝阳). ( November 2005). “Allegories in ‘The Book of Master Liè’ and the Ancient Robots”. Online: Journal of Heilongjiang College of Education. Vol.24 #6. Retrieved March 5, 2020 from https://wenku.baidu.com/view/b178f219f18583d049645952.html

[4] McKenna, A. (September 26, 2013). Al-Jazarī Arab inventor. In The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. Online: Encyclopaedia Britannica Retrieved on March 25, 2020 from https://www.britannica.com/biography/al-Jazari AND:

Al-Jazarī, Ismail al-Razzāz; Translated & annotated by Donald R. Hill. (1206). The Book of Knowledge of Ingenious Mechanical Devices. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing Company. Online Retrieved on March 25, 2020 from https://archive.org/details/TheBookOfKnowledgeOfIngeniousMechanicalDevices/mode/2up

[5] Bacaër, N. (2011). Verhulst and the logistic equation (1838). A Short History of Mathematical Population Dynamics. London: Springer. pp. 35–39. Information retrieved from https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-0-85729-115-8_6#citeas and from mathshistory.st-andrews.ac.uk/Biographies/Verhulst.html

[6] Davis, M. (2018). The Universal Computer: the road from Leibniz to Turing. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group

text | wondering, The field of AI

The Field of AI (part 01): Context, Learning & Evolution

April 9, 2020 animasuri

One could state that Artificial Intelligence (AI) methods enable the finding of and interaction with patterns in the information available from contexts to an event, object or fact. These can be shaped into data points and sets. Many of these sets are tremendously large data sets. So large are these pools of data, so interconnected and so changing that it is not possible for any human to see the patterns that are actually there or that are meaningful, or that can actually be projected to anticipate the actuality of an imagined upcoming event.

While not promising that technologies coming out from the field of AI are the only answer, nor the answer to everything, one could know their existence and perhaps apply some of the methods used in creating them. One could, furthermore, use aspects from within the field of AI to learn about a number of topics, even about the processes of learning itself, about how to find unbiased or biased patterns in the information presented to us. Studying some basics about this field could offer yet another angle of meaning-giving in the world around and within us. What is a pattern, if not an artificial promise to offer some form of meaning?

It’s not too far-fetched to state that the study of Artificial Intelligence is partly the study of cognitive systems[1] as well as the context within which these (could) operate. While considering AI[2], one might want to shortly consider “context.”

Here “context” is the set of conditions and circumstances preceding, surrounding or following a cognitive system and that related to its processed, experienced, imagined or anticipated events. One might want to weigh how crucial conditions and circumstances are or could be to both machine and human.[3] The field of AI is one of the fields of study that could perhaps offer one such opportunity.

A context is a source for a cognitive system to collect its (hopefully relevant) information, or at least, its data from. Cognitive Computing (CC) systems are said to be those systems that try to simulate the human thought processes, to solve problems, via computerized models.[4] It is understandable that some classify this as a subset of Computer Science while some will obviously classify CC as a (sometimes business-oriented) subset of the field of AI.[5] Others might link this closer to the academic work done in Cognitive Science. Whether biological or artificial, to a number of researchers the brain-like potentials are their core concern.[6]

As can be seen in a few of the definitions and as argued by some experts, the broad field of AI technologies do not necessarily have to mimic *human* thought processes or human intelligence alone. As such, AI methods might solve a problem in a different way from how a human might do it.

However similar or different, the meaning-giving information, gotten from a context, is important to both an AI solution as well as to a biological brain. One might wonder that it is their main reason for being: finding and offering meaning.

The contextual information an AI system collects could be (defined by or categorized as) time, locations, user profiles, rules, regulations, tasks, aims, sensory input, various other big to extremely huge data sets and the relationships between each of these data sets in terms of influencing or conflicting with one another. All of these sources for data are simultaneously creating increasing complexities, due to real-time changes (i.e. due to ambiguity, uncertainty, and shifts). AI technologies offer insights through their outputs of the *best* solution, rather than the one and only certain solution for a situation, in a context at a moment in spacetime.

The wish to understand and control “intelligence” has attracted humans for a long time. It is then reasonable to think that it will attract our species’ creative and innovative minds for a long time to come. It is in our nature to wonder, in general, and to wonder about intelligence and wisdom in specific; whatever their possible interlocked or independent definitions might be(come) and whichever their technological answers might be.

In considering this, one might want to be reminded that the scientific name of our species itself is a bit of a give-away of this (idealized) intention or aspiration: “Homo Sapiens.” This is the scientific name of our animal species. Somewhat loosely translated, it could be understood to mean: “Person of Wisdom”.

In the midst of some experts who think that presently our intelligence is larger than our wisdom, others feel that, if handled with care, consideration and contextualization, AI research and developments just might positively answer such claim or promise and might at least augment our human desires towards becoming wiser.[7] Just perhaps, some claim,[8] it might take us above and beyond[9] being Homo Sapiens.[10]

For now, we are humans exploring learning with and by machines in support of our daily yet global needs.

For you and I, the steps to such aim need to be practical. The resources to take the steps need to be graspable here and now.

At the foundation, to evaluate the validity or use of such claims, we need to understand a bit what we are dealing with. Besides the need for the nurturing of a number of dimensions in our human development, we might want to nurture our Technological Literacy (or “Technology Literacy”).[11]

A number of educators[12] seem to agree that,[13] while considering human experiences and their environments, this area of literacy is not too bad a place to start off with.[14] In doing so, we could specifically unveil a few points of insight associated with Artificial Intelligence; that human-made technological exploration of ambiguous intelligence.

Few people know that heart comes http://appalachianmagazine.com/2016/12/25/why-stink-bugs-are-taking-over-the-eastern-united-states/ online prescription for viagra under pressure, when stress control of the mind. The uses of alcohol, smoking, tobacco, and http://appalachianmagazine.com/2019/03/10/mountain-tradition-eating-ramps-in-springtime/ super generic viagra illegal drugs have great influence of carrying this sexual complication. You on line viagra can also get discount on bulk order for this product. While viagra lowest prices some states don’t need that this online drug is not good as their branded counterparts are.

[1] Sun F., Liu, H., Hu, D. (eds). (2019). Cognitive Systems and Signal Processing: 4th International Conference, ICCSIP 2018, Beijing, China, November 29 – December 1, 2018, Revised Selected Papers, Part 1 & Part 2. Singapore: Springer

[2] DeAngelis, S. F. (April 2014). Will 2014 be the Year you Fall in Love with Cognitive Computing? Online: WIRED. Retrieved November 22, 2019 from https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/04/will-2014-year-fall-love-cognitive-computing/

[3] Desouza, K. (October 13, 2016). How can cognitive computing improve public services? Online Brookings Institute’s Techtank Retrieved November 22, 2019 from https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2016/10/13/how-can-cognitive-computing-improve-public-services/

[4] Gokani, J. (2017). Cognitive Computing: Augmenting Human Intelligence. Online: Stanford University; Stanford Management Science and Engineering; MS&E 238 Blog. Retrieved November 22, 2019 from https://www.datarobot.com/wiki/cognitive-computing/

[5] https://www.datarobot.com/wiki/cognitive-computing/

[6] One example is: Poo, Mu-ming. (November 2, 2016). China Brain Project: Basic Neuroscience, Brain Diseases, and Brain-Inspired Computing. Neuron 92, NeuroView, pp. 591-596. Online: Elsevier Inc. Retrieved on February 25, 2020 from https://www.cell.com/neuron/pdf/S0896-6273(16)30800-5.pdf . Another example is: The work engaged at China’s Research Center for Brain-Inspired Intelligence (RCBII), by the teams led by Dr XU, Bo and Dr. ZENG, Yi. Founded in April 2015, at the CAS’ Institute of Automation, the center contains 4 research teams: 1. The Cognitive Brain Modeling Group (aka Brain-Inspired Cognitive Computation); 2. The Brain-Inspired Information Processing Group; 3. The Neuro-robotics Group (aka Brain-Inspired Robotics and Interaction) and 4. Micro-Scale Brain Structure Reconstruction. Find some references here: bii.ia.ac.cn

[7] Harari, Y. N. (2015). Sapiens. A Brief History of Humankind. New York: HarperCollings Publisher

[8] Gillings, M. R., et al. (2016). Information in the Biosphere: Biological and Digital Worlds. Online: University California, Davis (UCD). Retrieved on March 25, 2020 from https://escholarship.org/uc/item/38f4b791

[9] (01 June 2008). Tech Luminaries Address Singularity. Online: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE Spectrum). Retrieved on March 25, 2020 from https://spectrum.ieee.org/static/singularity

[10] Maynard Smith, J. et al. (1995). The Major Transitions in Evolution. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press AND Calcott, B., et al. (2011). The Major Transitions in Evolution Revisited. The Vienna Series in Theoretical Biology. Boston, MA: The MIT Press.

[11] National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council. (2002). Technically Speaking: Why All Americans Need to Know More About Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press Online: NAP Retrieved on March 25, 2020 from https://www.nap.edu/read/10250/chapter/3

[12] Search, for instance, the search string “Technological Literacy” through this online platform: The Education Resources Information Center (ERIC), USA https://eric.ed.gov/?q=Technological+Literacy

[13] Dugger, W. E. Jr. et al (2003). Advancing Excellence in Technology Literacy. In Phi Delta Kappan, v85 n4 p316-20 Dec 2003 Retrieved on March 25, 2020 from https://eric.ed.gov/?q=Technology+LIteracy&ff1=subTechnological+Literacy&ff2=autDugger%2c+William+E.%2c+Jr.&pg=2

[14] Cydis, S. (2015). Authentic Instruction and Technology Literacy. In Journal of Learning Design 2015 Vol. 8 No.1 pp. 68 – 78. Online: Institute of Education Science (IES) & The Education Resources Information Center (ERIC), USA. Retrieved on March 25, 2020 from https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ1060125.pdf

IMAGE CREDITS:

An example artificial neural network with a hidden layer.

en:User:Cburnett / CC BY-SA (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/) Retrieved on March 12, 2020 from https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e4/Artificial_neural_network.svg

text | poetry, text | wondering

In-Between Languages

November 11, 2019 animasuri

Learning and using multiple languages enables one to play in-between the languages. Since I believe (and I am not alone) that languages exist intertwined with cultures, one is hence also playing in-between cultures; perhaps unwittingly so.

…our earliest pets, totems, talisman or mascots?

This in-between interaction enables (at least me and, as I observe, also some others) a form of playful language (usage and construction) that can only exist and be understood by those enabled to be moving in-between them.

At least metaphorically (but I sense this is very practical or pragmatic as well), this is allowing the player to stand on the proverbial door sill. This is in turn allowing the player (limited in this writing here by the highly constraining, linear nature of language constructs, such as sentences in paragraphs) to be looking, at least, at the one language usage on one side and at the other on the other side (if applying the play between two languages only, while multiple language usage is plausible as well). The player then can be “tasting” (and, simultaneously, be creating ) the linguistic mixture, as an observer and producer. The player can do so in-between two or more languages.

This awareness is not particularly new nor is it unique.

For instance, in China’s broadcasts, of its voice radio performance art, one can, at times, listen to wordsmiths playing in-between English and Chinese. For instance, they might use an English word or two that sound like a very different Chinese word. Though, the audience or creators might be “limited” to Mandarin and some basic English, nevertheless, it is just that: a creative fluidity in-between languages (for the moment ignoring the motivation or the perception thereof, in this particular reference).

An example between Dutch and Chinese could be this: “poesje“, which is Dutch for “small cat“. It sounds, via slight shifts in the Dutch pronunciation, as /bu-shi/ , which could, besides conjuring a rude English wording, also be shifted into the Chinese “bù shì” (不是). These two Chinese characters stand for “not” and “is“, or slightly more freely translated, as “not yes“. In turn this could be used to mean something as “not“, “no“, “it isn’t“…

If “bù shì poesje” then what is it?

I sense one can see this activity as an analogy of potential processes and actual evolution in any creation or (in-between) any framework. One might perceive these as experiments of shifts and “perversions” (depending on one’s “political” stance) into innovations or into new and different languages or into potentially new meaning-giving. This could occur, at least, at the level of the individual or in-between a few initiated individuals. This movement could transcode from the absurd into the formal and vice versa.

Is this a movement similar to that one person’s crazy idea that can only become accepted if a second person endorses it (preferably a second person otherwise unassociated with the first person) and then becomes a movement by the undefined masses following it? I now see a thought turned into a (set of meaning-imbued) word(s), turned into a culture.

As a sidenote:

"Framework" here is meant as a collection of thought creations (e.g. a connection of associated concepts).

For instance, I, as one individual, over my life span, have cognitively collected a number of frameworks. Such Frameworks, I sense, are semiotic and thus have linguistic or meaning-giving features. I perceive them as being cultural in nature.

I feel these, to me, do not simply have to consist of isolated memorized words. I imagine these might consist of unclear networks of not well-defined emotions, blurry definitions, attached to opaque images, other words and fading experiences. In turn these interconnected meaning-giving items are vaguely set into complexes of intuitions.

I feel, for me, these sets form an undefined number of frameworks in my mind. Some seem fluid and temporary while others seem more stubborn and fixated. While some frameworks feel as if overlapping, others are contradictory to one another, adjacent or seemingly entirely unrelated, except then by one attribute: they are my metaphorical constructs in my brain.

I use these frameworks as references to make sense of the world around me; ever so transiently. I also explore the spaces in-between frameworks.

One such framework is my vague and abstract conception of one language; let's say English. Another framework could be another language.

Such a framework could also be my adoption and adaptation of a set of believes one, and one's community, holds or a set of habits, or attributes recognized as memes of one human collective (e.g. a community or a set of ideas held in one's brain), etc. For instance: the Flemish, the Beijingers, the Belgians, the Europeans, The Han, The Asians, The people on the subway, the people in the building I work or those where I live, The people in a news clip, etc.; a set of cultural frameworks.

As another example, a framework I hold could also be built around the concept of "data" or a specific set of data. For instance: the number of people who suffered fatal or other injuries, say, due to road vehicles, let's say in the USA from one specific year to another.

I imagine this in-between play as potentially being an example (with practical implications) of Deleuze’s territorialization, de-territorialization and re-territorialization. Therefor the in-between is always a becoming rather than a being. I also see it as a possible candidate example of fluidity, and of inherent changes that occur beyond one or two or more fixed frameworks one might hold on to (e.g. the use and learning of one language only).

I sense this in-between activity, its existence, the existence of the potential links, the existence of the potential shifts in meaning and usage, are a collection of human output (somewhere floating between being willingly or being serendipitously expressed) which are too often ignored, and I dare state, which might have non-party political consequences.

As a second sidenote: 

"Political" here is meant as how we act as citizens among each other within the "polis"; i.e. the city of our daily activities and power-relations. 

I sense these in-between expressions might highlight or unveil or at least create imaginations about power-relations and the shift thereof across languages. 

I admit, they make me, rather then perhaps you, think about this. Granted,  possibly this tells me more about my own obsessions with power-relations rather than it stating anything substantial or corroborative about what I think to perceive. 

That stated, please let us continue to allow the process of potential discovery by means of initially unsubstantiated imagination and naive wonder.

Yes, for the moment I opt to sense that one can best achieve this exploration (either in daily personal experiences and poetics, or as a stepping stone towards rigorous analysis) with and in-between any number of languages and any number of other languages and dialects (yes, dialects, since some claim that “language” is a dialect “with an army”…) .

The experience of an (intangible) in-between space has been on my mind for as long as I remember. Especially the etymology as observable in-between two distinct official languages yet, with some degree of common ancestry.

For instance, the present-day English word ” mascot” or “mascotte” (in Dutch) compared to the Spanish word “mascota“. The latter means “pet” (English) or “huisdier” (Dutch), which again translated to English might make for a (to me) fun new word: “house-animal“…

In a moment of associated digression: Is a couch potato a species of “house-animal“? …

…” My favorite pet is a potato . It likes staying home, lie on the couch and watch a movie. It’s such a house-animal; I enjoy petting my potato.” …
–the pet owner (pulled from my imagination).

Coming back to the main storyline: one touches on the semantic realm of “talisman” (i.e. “mascot” & “mascotte“) while the other touches on the realm of companionship for a human and this of an animal, other than human (yes, imagine…), for instance, a dog or a tarantula (i.e. “mascota“) .

If we were to dig a bit deeper we could argue that both (“mascotte” and “mascota“) are about companionship yet the intuitively comparable power-relation might be different, or is it?

I am excitingly concerned about how one could achieve this comparison in a quantitative manner, besides my often-faulty yet beloved intuition, which I am presently applying. I also wonder, in a dance with an old polemic, whether we, as humans, should only value the quantitative (notice, please, my stress on ‘only’). For sure, this entire in-between language is not quantatative in nature; it’s pure nurture coming naturally to me. (I hope you can read the serious irony here).

Webcopy Services it has been shown that diabetes is a metabolic disorder which does not produce or viagra cialis on line properly uses insulin in the human body. The answer is correct that cialis for sale australia impotency and it is done by the suffering person itself. In case you’re suffering from fibromyalgia, then ask your doctor to prevent future complications that may lead to more serious health problem that you may not be aware of. * More powerful type of buy levitra that guarantees men treatment through erectile dysfunction* Achievement ratio is much more in contrast to levitra* The pill offers dual action, & inhibit PDE5 in addition to lessen the. Men generally face numerous troubles associated with levitra generic cialis fertility.

Coming back to the in-between language play: the word “mascot” can semantically and denotatively (i.e. as being,
“in accordance with fact or the primary meaning of a term“) be mapped with the word “talisman” which, in turn, can be mapped with words such as the nouns “charm” or “amulet“.

Some claim that a “mascota” has a “master” (…you still don’t see power-play at play? Think about the use of “pet” in relation to excessive loyalty of an employee to a superior); does a mascot have a master?

In some storytelling I have noticed that some iteration playing with the concept of the talisman also links the mascot to a master, as a pet is to one.

One can see the animation series, based on a game, entitled “Wakfu” for such narrative . In it the character named “Sir Percedal of Sadlygrove” is emboldened by his powerful luck-bringing sword …and as I notice how a charm or talisman is applied in narratives, these are not always charming nor offering good luck at all times. Yes, as could a cat, a mascot can scratch you the wrong way!

The offered mapping with the word “talisman” and with “Wakfu“, mentioned above, might be acceptable if one could allow for an imaginary and literary “good” demon-possessed item to be seen as a “talisman” or as a bringer-of-luck, does then my pet give me extra power?

Some teams do have, for instance, a living pet dog as a mascot. Moreover, and ever so slightly in dissonance, notice that etymologically, the word mascot is claimed to have associations with “witch”, “wizard”, “nightmare”, “mask” and “black”). Are my pets not what they seems to be?

While in “actual” life, I have heard of, someone carrying a plastic chain-restaurant’s spoon to a sports match, believing it allows their favorite team to win, in Wakfu it is, for instance, a consciously possessed sword.

This is obviously fantasy narrative –I mean, Wakfu. Yes, one might consider the above-mentioned spoon equally fantastical. Yet, this latter reference is a factual example. This is while perhaps one might feel more accepting towards a scarf or a never-washed t-shirt instead of a spoon.

By the way, in the spirit of this text, you might like to know that in Wakfu, these demons which posses linearly-practical objects, turning the items into charms of sorts, are called “shushu(s)”. Interestingly–talking about in-between languages– “Shūshu” ( 叔叔), in Chinese, means “uncle“. Besides the obvious family-relation, it is also used as a name of endearment–yes! that’s a “pet name” for ye– to refer to older male individuals who are not actually related by blood. For instance, my children refer to their Chinese school bus driver as Shūshu. Is this now a magic school bus? Perhaps, in a sense, in Wakfu, this is a sword, giving its adventurous user extra power. In effect, this Sir Percedal character, who wields such powerful sword, might have a relationship with this magical sword as if one has a relationship with a pet. The character is at times rather literally defined by the sword, as a sports team is unitingly defined by its mascot. Perhaps as this is as much as a master is defined by their pet and their pet by them (…it is said that the bacteria in one’s body are defined by the kind of pet one nurtures).

Is this where “mascotte” and “mascota” meet?

…maybe not, maybe the perceived link between “mascot” and “mascota” is entirely serendipitous. Or, maybe one can judge it as a negative form of cultural appropriation; but then, which culture is appropriating which (a topic that could use a posting of its own)? Maybe, in similarity with “salary” and “celery” which are sounding rather similar yet, one being healthier and the other being more or less edible (or something of the sort), such serendipity could be sufficient. In truth, I admit, the second meaning of the Spanish word “mascota” is indeed ” the animal that represents a team.” What then are the links between a pet and a mascot?

Do I believe in mascots as being like a talisman;.. I personally do not; it’s too irrational for my taste. However, I know many out there (e.g. in sports or in brand loyalty) who do. In human (pre)history we can surely uncover this strong and deep-seated conviction (e.g. in Shamanism, in the wearing of a powerful animal’ skin or skeletal parts, etc.). Is it in Shamanism where we could unveil the cross-over between talisman, mascot and pet? One might have heard of animal spirits… Is this where the Pharaohs and their cats lived in-between the world of the “pet” and the world of the “mascota”? Is the trans-language activity allowing us to, more or less easily, shift in-between more than just a linear translation?

The relationship and experiences I sense which I could have with a “mascotte” versus that of a “mascota“, versus that of a “pet“, are very different. While arguably “mascota” and “pet” are the “same”, I can guarantee you: I do not perceive them as the same; not at all (besides the rational yet reductionist knowledge they are “translatables” between English and Spanish). I could elaborate yet the feelings are still conflicting and chaotically intertwined as the yarn my cat-companions got their paws on during their not-so-quiet midnight hours.

As a third sidenote: 

I am learning Spanish. The arguments as to why I am can be covered in another posting. 

However, this exploration of the in-between aids me to stoke the fire of increased willingness to continue my studies. It also aids me to look deeper and see hints of associations between words, beyond one language alone (...there are links between pets and mascots). 

It allows me to slowly but surely unveil my blindness into other languages and areas:  Italian: mascotte; Portuguese: mascote‎;  Spanish: mascota‎; and to me excitingly surprising even  
Polish: maskotka‎. 

I imagine that the act of this inter-language play, functions as an object of my imaginary making. I imagine it as my personal talisman. As much as the meaning of "talisman" is that of being an object that completes another object, the linguistic inter-play completes a passion for learning via the ritual of the creative act. The in-between language play increases a sense of playful power, energy (rejuvenation of learning), and perhaps other learning benefits. 

Additional reasoning as to why this works for me could be yet another posting.

Another example is the Spanish word “negocio“, which seems to mean “business“. Following, I believe I can claim that “Su negocio” means “(their/her/…) your business” as in, for instance, “their shop“. In English a seemingly similar word exists, “negotiation“. Sure, for both we can follow the thread back to the common source in Latin: negotiari (“to carry on business”), from negotium (“business”).

Nevertheless, one word, the English word “business“, feels –that is, as in the initial moment of my sensation of perceiving some meaning– as it connotes (to me, at least) a fixed point, a done deal. The other, the Spanish word “negocio”, when overshadowed with the English word “negotiation”, superficially connotes (to me) a process; not a done deal. This is all the while, contradictory, the Spanish word in isolation away from the English, could feel to me as referring to someone’s shop, someone’s business; a fixed location. I am confident, as time and thinking passes by, that my sensations might change.

Consecutively and for now, I continue to wonder whether in one or versus a combinatorial language-usage, the business owner might experience to be more confronted with the constant uninterrupted negotiations it takes to maintain a business in relation to many an intrinsic and extrinsic force, support, constraint, potential or many a stakeholder. On the other hand, this is all the while in the other language one (me) might more easily go with an assumption where, following a negotiation, one is “in business“. This feels perhaps as if arrived at a specific point of an almost unquestioned doing and being “in business”. Is one more or less delusional / irrational then the other? Does one lead to more or less entrepreneurial dare and risk taking than the other? I imagine yet, I cannot (yet) know. I do question whether anyone has done any research on differences in perceptions and consequential (in)action compared between (multi-)language groups?

I am noticing some writing, in various media outlets, and in a number of fields (e.g. in topics covering psychology, business, well-being, ethics, leadership, etc) that do mention the effect and affect of language usage on the well-being of one’s self and in-between oneself and others. The co-creation of the poetic experience with real-life consequences is exciting to me, to say the least.

In any case, I have been using this in-between language learning and expression for many years now. I also use it with friends across cultures (e.g. my Chinese friends) . This play seems to be universally sensed. At the least, pragmatically, it has helped to strengthen social bonds through playfulness.

Epilogue: My two cats are wonderful pets and this while they do scratch and destroy, as two little demons of the night. Look at their picture, heading this text! However cute, as far as them being charms or talismans, I am not yet convinced.  In retrospect, instead of having named them Luna and Molly I could have named one Charm and the other Mascota... oh well...

text | wondering

AI, Impact Investment, Ethics & Deeply Human-Centered Innovation

August 27, 2019 animasuri

Contents

This class of drugs also includes buy sildenafil india and viagra. What is the reason of Kamagra’s popularity? Increasing number of people are turning to the internet for their medication requirements, and this includes over-the-counter medications as well as prescribed ones like brand viagra overnight. Many men as well as couples prefer order generic viagra over other ED drugs. cialis causes fast and effective reaction by helping the men to get prolonged, harder and better erection. Many surveys revealed that after having a range of effective ED pills, still many order cialis canada of the ED sufferers for their sexual disorder.

End-notes & Categorized References.

[iOi]